The increasing focus on quantum threats is reshaping how security leaders approach their organization’s defenses. However, a significant misunderstanding persists: many believe that implementing protections at the surface level, such as their website’s front end, equates to comprehensive quantum readiness across their operations.
Research from F5 Labs reveals that 54% of the top one million websites now employ post-quantum key exchange techniques. This figure is encouraging, especially considering that only 27% of Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs) reported actual implementation of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) strategies, according to a KPMG survey conducted earlier this year. Nevertheless, a deeper examination shows that much of this apparent progress stems from content delivery network (CDN) providers enabling PQC by default, rather than organizations actively upgrading their infrastructure to address quantum threats.
David Warburton, director of F5 Labs, cautions against interpreting the 54% statistic as a definitive sign of readiness. When you factor out sites hosted by Cloudflare, the percentage supporting PQC plummets to just 22%. F5 Labs' research focused solely on the front-facing components of websites, leaving behind a critical aspect: the application servers that process requests behind the scenes.
"Those internal connections could be prime targets for what we call 'harvest now, decrypt later' attacks," Warburton warns, highlighting the vulnerability that lies beyond the public edge.
Beyond the Edge
Experts agree that true post-quantum readiness necessitates a comprehensive upgrade of the entire technology stack. While edge adoption marks progress, it cannot serve as a sole measure for an organization's readiness, explains Anastazija Pažin, a senior cybersecurity consultant at Deloitte. "While CDN-enabled PQC provides real protection for client-to-edge connections, this shield doesn't extend to the origin servers or internal communications," she says.
Post-quantum migration efforts are accelerating where centralization is possible, yet this gap exists partly due to the lag in guidance aligning with evolving standards, according to Ben Packman, chief strategy officer at PQC specialists PQShield. He highlights that while the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published its first set of PQC standards in 2024, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) only finalized the definition for hybrid post-quantum key exchange mechanisms within TLS 1.3 recently.
Technical Debt
Existing technical debt presents substantial hurdles in upgrading to quantum cryptography. Many organizations still rely on legacy technologies, older client systems, and complex partner integrations, hampering swift transitions. Additionally, many vendors have yet to provide updates to their products to support PQC, creating yet another layer of complexity.
Warburton notes that while 54% of websites support PQC key exchange, PQC certificates are still unavailable for the public internet. Although innovations like Merkle Tree Certificates support browser usage, other environments will face challenges due to significantly larger certificate sizes.
The management of certificates itself is a notable obstacle. Organizations using manual provisioning methods may grapple with serious difficulties as shorter certificate lifetimes, such as the impending 47-day enforcement, take effect.
Particularly concerning is the PQC-readiness gap seen in sectors handling sensitive data with longer lifespans—only 35% of government and telecommunications websites surveyed supported post-quantum key exchange.
Industry Differences
When examining different sectors, critical infrastructure and government organizations often face more significant challenges due to their long-lived operational technologies and slower procurement processes. F5 Labs' analysis revealed that over 10% of surveyed websites still lacked support for TLS 1.3, which is essential for the post-quantum key exchanges tested.
F5 posits that while establishing protections at a website's public interface is a commendable step, it fails to assure that an organization’s internal servers and applications are equipped to handle quantum-related threats. However, Chris Hickman, CSO at Keyfactor, provides a broader perspective: “Leading industries in PQC readiness, like financial services and telecommunications, are leveraging cryptographic inventories and risk assessments, indicating proactive steps beyond mere web presence,” he states.
Financial institutions and critical infrastructure players are increasingly formulating plans to address PQC, but Deloitte's Pažin points out that readiness planning must not be mistaken for readiness in deployment. He illustrates the complexities faced by financial institutions regarding their hardware modules and payment infrastructures, while telecommunications providers manage vast network infrastructures that complicate the transition to PQC.
Preparing for PQC
For organizations aiming to enhance their quantum readiness, a strategic approach begins with cataloging current cryptographic use, prioritizing sensitive data, and mapping out the longest upgrade pathways. Warburton emphasizes the necessity of looking beyond the external website to include internal applications, APIs, and embedded libraries.
Establishing a cryptographic bill of materials is crucial, along with designating responsibility for maintaining it. Organizations should seek to eliminate legacy dependencies, enable hybrid PQC where feasible, and automate certificate management processes. "The ability to modify algorithms and certificates without prolonging each update is essential," he adds.
Ultimately, Pažin asserts that a meaningful assessment of enterprise readiness should reflect a comprehensive understanding of cryptographic dependencies and an organization’s capability to address quantum-related risks effectively without considerable disruption.
